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INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY: 
IN DEFENSE OF UNIVERSALISM 
Andrew T. Guzman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The globalization of business activity is rightfully celebrated as one 
of the triumphs of the second half of the twentieth century. The bene­
fits stemming from the globalization of commerce are substantial, but 
international transactions also bring with them important challenges 
for the world's legal systems. Traditionally, national governments 
could focus on their domestic economies without undue attention to 
international issues. Today, however, a country's policymakers must 
respond to the growth in international business activity with appropri­
ate legal changes. Failure to do so will cause their legal regimes to fall 
further and further out of step with the needs of the global market­
place. The exact content of the changes to be made, however, remains 
uncertain. This Article attempts to address one of the many interna­
tional business issues that is forcing us to change the way we think 
about regulating cross-border activity - the treatment of transna­
tional bankruptcy. 
It is a fact of economic life that businesses fail. The growth of in­
ternational business, therefore, has brought with it a growth in the 
number of international business failures.1 In recent years, the in­
creased number of international insolvencies has brought attention to 
the question of how to deal with transnational bankruptcies.2 That 
* Acting Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. B.S. 
Toronto, 1990; J.D., Ph.D. Harvard, 1996. - Ed. I owe thanks to Lucian Bebchnk, Richard 
Brooks, Richard Buxbaum, Stephen Choi, Kevin Davis, Robert Cooter, Jesse Fried, Lynn 
LoPucki, Robert Rasmussen, Dhan Shivakumar, Frederick Tung, Elizabeth Warren, John 
Yoo, and participants at the Boalt Hall Law and Economics Seminar for helpful comments 
and discussions. Special thanks to Jeannie Sears and Nicholas James. Melissa Kennedy and 
Ryan Waterman provided invaluable research assistance. 
1. Well-known examples of transnational bankruptcies include Maxwell Communica­
tions, see In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 {Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bank 
of Credit & Commerce International (BCCI), see Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International 
Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 487 (1992); and Olympia and York, see In re 
Olympia & York Devs. Ltd. [1993] 12 O.R.3d 500. 
2 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transna­
tional Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775 {1999); Douglas G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy 
Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation]; Robert K. Rasmussen, A 
New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 {1997); Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. 499 
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said, it must be noted that cross-border business failures are new to 
neither the business world nor academia. Nor has there been a great 
shift in the perspective of legal academics over the years. In an article 
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1888, John Lowell wrote: "It 
is obvious that . . . it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all 
settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made in 
a single proceeding, and generally at a single place."3 One hundred 
years later, the call for "universalism" continues: "[A]ll questions of 
importance to the distribution of the debtor's assets should be gov­
erned by the law of the debtor's principal place of business."4 Legisla­
tors5 and judges, however, have resisted these academic proposals out 
of concern for the welfare of domestic creditors.6 This Article seeks to 
address that concern directly. 
(1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Choice of Law]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and 
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 457 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism]. 
3. John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors, 1 HARV. L. 
REV. 259, 264 (1888). 
4. Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 58 (1988) [hereinafter Trautman, Foreign Creditors]. Similar state­
ments can be found in almost any article on the subject. See, e.g., Todd Kraft & Allison 
Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 
329, 364 ("A system that brings together all the creditors, and all the debtor's property, for a 
single distribution is the most efficient and equitable system possible."); Westbrook, Choice 
of Law, supra note 2, at 515 ("Universality . . .  has long been accepted as the proper goal of 
international bankruptcy law by leading writers."); Jay L. Westbrook & Donald T. 
Trautman, Conflict of Laws Issues in International Insolvencies, in CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 
655, 667 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) ("In general, the goal in developing choice of law rules 
should be to apply the home-country law as pervasively as possible."). But see LoPucki, s11-
pra note 2, passim (arguing against universalism); Stacey A. Morales & Barbara A. Deutcsh, 
Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of 
Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573, 1595-96 (1984) (arguing for retention of U.S. jurisdiction over a 
foreign debtor's U.S. assets "unless the standards of section 304 clearly mandate that such 
control be relinquished through the mechanism of turnover"). 
5. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 71 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 324-25 (1977). The 
statute itself expresses concern for local creditors, instructing courts to consider "protection 
of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience." 11 U.S.C. § 
304(c)(2). 
6. This characterization is accurate both in the United States and in other countries, but 
this Article focuses on the United States because it is the jurisdiction with which I am famil­
iar and because "American statutory law goes further than the law of any other industrial­
ized nation in authorizing cooperation with foreign insolvency regimes." Douglas G. 
Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thought Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 
931, 932 (1994). By examining the American situation, we learn a great deal about why 
there is not a greater global push for universality. For a discussion of the laws of various 
countries, see INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES (Richard A. Gitlin 
& Rona R. Mears eds., 1989). For a discussion of attempts at multilateral solutions, see 
Michael Bogdan, The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 4, at 701; 
Kraft & Aranson, supra note 4, at 351-61; Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for Inter· 
national Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573 (1993). 
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In simplified terms, two polar approaches to the adjudication of in­
ternational insolvencies exist: universalism and territorialism. In its 
purest form, universalism would have all bankruptcy claims adjudi­
cated within the debtor's "home country" and would apply the sub­
stantive laws of that country. Based on the law of that jurisdiction, the 
assets of the firm would be distributed to creditors around the world.7 
The alternative to universalism is territorialism or, more pejoratively, 
the "grab rule."8 Under this rule, "the courts in each national jurisdic­
tion seize the property physically within their control and distribute it 
according to local rules."9 Critiques of the territorialist position are 
numerous and will not be repeated in detail here.10 For present pur­
poses, it is enough to note that proponents of universalism argue that 
it would yield a variety of benefits, including a more efficient ex ante 
allocation of capital,11 reduced administrative costs due to a reduction 
in the number of proceedings,12 avoidance of forum shopping and the 
race to file,13 facilitated reorganizations,14 increased liquidation value,15 
and the provision of clarity and certainty to all parties.16 The most 
7. Several variations on universality have been proposed. A complete description of the 
alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article. One possible form of universalism grants 
discretion to local courts regarding the turning over of assets to the home jurisdiction. This 
approach has been termed "modified universalism." See Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra 
note 2, at 517. An alternative approach permits local courts to carry out a "secondary bank­
ruptcy proceeding" - distributing assets in order to protect local creditors and then turning 
any remaining assets over to the main proceeding. This is the approach advocated by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency. See UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW ON CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT (1999); see 
also Andre J. Berends, UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Compre­
hensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309 (1998). 
8. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 513. Universalism and territori­
alism are, of course, merely the endpoints of a spectrum. Although proposals tend to be 
clearly more toward one end or the other, most advocate a position somewhere between the 
extremes. Most recently, a variation on territorialism, called "cooperative territoriality" has 
been proposed. This regime is sinillar to territorialism, with the added feature that countries 
would cooperate to reduce the burden of filing in multiple jurisdictions; share information 
regarding distributions; allow the joint sale of assets when necessary to maximize value; fa­
cilitate the seizure and return of assets subject to avoidable transfers; and allow the volun­
tary investment by representatives in one country in the debtor's reorganization in another. 
See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 742. 
9. Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 513. 
10. See generally Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2; Rasmussen, supra note 2; 
Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 2; Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2. 
11. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2.  
12. See id. at 778. 
13. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 6-10. 
14. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 465. 
15. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 18. 
16. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2; Jay L. Westbrook, Universal 
Participation in Transnational Bankruptcies, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: EsSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 419, 421 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997) ("Territorialism produces dis­
tributions that are a function of local priorities and the presence of a greater abundance of 
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eloquent and effective proponent of universalism in the last decade 
has been Jay Westbrook, who has also contributed to this sympo­
sium.17 Although Professor Westbrook and I approach the subject of 
international bankruptcies from somewhat different perspectives, we 
hold very similar views of the preferred policy prescription. With this 
in mind, and in the interest of space, I will not address his arguments 
directly in this Article. If I did, it would be primarily to express my 
support for his views. 
Territorialist objections to universalism center on the treatment of 
small, local creditors. United States courts often express reluctance to 
tum assets over to foreign jurisdictions when doing so would put local 
creditors at a disadvantage, ex post, relative to foreign creditors. The 
academic criticism of universalism is similarly focused on the treat­
ment of local creditors, although the argument is somewhat more sub­
tle. The argument against universalism rests on the belief that "uni­
versalism would be unpredictable to all but the largest creditors of 
multinational companies."18 It is claimed that only they would have 
enough at stake to warrant adjustment.19 This Article attempts to 
make progress toward resolving the debate between universalists and 
territorialists through an analysis of this most central element of the 
criticism of universalism. Is there a class of creditors that is better off 
under territorialism? If so, how many such creditors are there and 
how much do they stand to lose? What conclusions can we reach 
about overall social welfare in the face of these concerns? 
To understand why the debate needs to focus on what are termed 
"nonadjusting creditors," one needs to recognize that in a competitive 
market - the most reasonable assumption for capital markets -
"adjusting creditors" (those who adjust the terms of their lending to 
reflect the risks they face) will earn a market rate of return regardless 
of the choice of bankruptcy rule.20 If all creditors are adjusting, the 
debtor will bear all costs imposed by the choice of law rule because 
competitive pressures will prevent the creditors from earning more or 
less than the risk-adjusted market rate. In a particular case, of course, 
local creditors may be at a disadvantage, from an ex post perspective, 
assets in one jurisdiction than in another. . . . The distributions are always unpredictable 
and often unfair."). 
17. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 2276 (2000). 
18. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 712. 
19. See id. 
20. The terms "adjusting" and "nonadjusting" creditors are borrowed from Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bank· 
ruptcy, 105 YALELJ. 857 (1996) (hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case]. 
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relative to foreign creditors.21 As long as the creditors understand the 
bankruptcy rules ex ante, however, they will be able to adjust the out­
of-bankruptcy rate of return that they demand.22 
From the perspective of the debtor, however, the choice of regime 
is important even if all creditors adjust, because a reduction in the 
costs imposed by the bankruptcy system will reduce the overall cost of 
lending - leading to a reduction in the cost of capital for debtors. 
From the debtor's point of view, therefore, bankruptcy policy should 
be guided by the overall efficiency of the system. For these purposes, 
universalism offers the most appealing regime because it provides 
greater certainty with respect to the applicable rules, lower litigation 
coi;ts, and a better system for reorganizations than does territorial­
ism.23 
The current debate, therefore, focuses on three groups - adjusting 
creditors, who are indifferent to the choice of regime; debtors, who 
prefer universalism because it imposes lower costs; and nonadjusting 
creditors, whose role is examined in this Article. Unless nonadjusting 
creditors suffer losses under universalism that outweigh the efficiency 
benefits of that regime, territorialism must be rejected. To date, there 
has been no clear analysis of the impact of universalism on nonad­
justing creditors, making it difficult to evaluate the claims in favor of 
territorialism. This Article provides the analysis required to evaluate 
those claims and, in the end, finds them wanting. 
Part II of this Article defines what are termed "nonadjusting credi­
tors," and explains why understanding the role of these actors is criti­
cal to understanding the debate on transnational bankruptcy. Part III 
presents a theoretical analysis and the impact of territorialism and 
universalism on nonadjusting creditors. Part IV examines the costs of 
each regime, and demonstrates that the costs of territorialism out­
weigh the costs of universalism. 
II. NONADJUSTING CREDITORS 
A. Nonadjusting Creditors Defined 
The category of "nonadjusting creditors" includes any creditors 
that cannot, or will not, adjust the terms of their loans on a case-by­
case basis in order to take into account the risks associated with the 
21. On the other hand, the opposite will be true in other cases - that is, local creditors 
will enjoy an advantage ex post if the bankruptcy is local. 
22. In fact, creditors may make adjustments to the rules in ways other than through the 
interest rate. They may, for example, alter the maturity of loans, alter the monitoring provi­
sions, take more collateral, and so on. In the interests of simplicity and expositional ease, 
this Article will speak only of changes in the interest rate. 
23. This claim may provoke objections from territorialists. In any case, this Article ad­
dresses the efficiency issue in Part III. 
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loan, including the risk of nonpayment. Tort creditors, for example, 
enter into a creditor relationship with tortfeasors involuntarily and 
obviously do not adjust the terms of that relationship to reflect the risk 
that the debtor may not pay. The nonadjusting creditor category in­
cludes both involuntary creditors, such as taxation authorities and tort 
creditors, as well as voluntary creditors, such as trade creditors.24 
The general category of nonadjusting creditors can be further di­
vided into two subcategories, which I term "weakly nonadjusting" and 
"strongly nonadjusting." Both subcategories are nonadjusting in the 
sense that they are unable or unwilling to alter the terms of their loan 
based on the identity of the borrower. The creditors differ, however, 
in the extent to which they adjust credit terms over their entire port­
folio of lending. 
Nonadjusting creditors are termed weakly nonadjusting when they 
account for the risks they face by adjusting the terms of their loans on 
an expected value basis calculated over their entire portfolio of loans. 
For example, credit card companies are weakly nonadjusting creditors. 
A credit card company will charge a single interest rate to all of its 
cardholders, without differentiating one cardholder from another 
based on the risk of nonpayment.25 The company, however, will set its 
overall interest rate such that it earns, in expectation, a competitive 
rate of return. The weakly nonadjusting category might also include 
retail customers, trade creditors, employees, landlords, educational 
lenders, and health care providers.26 Each of these groups provides 
credit voluntarily, but typically does not adjust the terms of the credit 
on a debtor-by-debtor basis. 
Most weakly nonadjusting creditors could, in principle, adjust each 
individual loan to take into account the risks presented by a particular 
debtor. Nevertheless, a creditor may rationally choose to remain 
nonadjusting because, for example, it is too costly to conduct a careful 
examination of each transaction and to structure appropriate terms for 
a specific loan. To assess the risk presented by a particular debtor, a 
creditor must consider the value of that debtor's assets, the amount of 
debt carried by the debtor, the relevant provisions of the applicable 
bankruptcy regime, and so on. Furthermore, even if the creditor col­
lected this information, there would remain the cost of negotiating ap-
24. Although some voluntary creditors (including trade creditors) may be labeled 
nonadjusting, it should be kept in mind that they are likely to be at least partially adjusting. 
Such creditors may, for example, refuse to lend to debtors that are considered too much of a 
credit risk. 
25. More sophisticated approaches exist, of course. The credit card company may de­
cide to charge a different rate to different categories of cardholders, for example. Never­
theless, such creditors do not tailor the terms of their lending on a debtor-by-debtor basis. 
26. See, e.g., John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 47, 56 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy: Bank­
ruptcy, Priority, and Economics," 15 VA. L. REV. 219, 225 (1989). 
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propriate terms for a loan in light of the particularities of the debtor. 
In cases where these costs are relatively high and the amount of credit 
sought is relatively small, the creditor may find it more efficient to ap­
ply a single rate of interest to all its debtors. Again, credit card lend­
ing fits this description - it is simply too costly for a credit card com­
pany to assess the credit risk presented by each card holder, so the 
credit card company simply charges the same rate to each of them.27 
In contrast to weakly nonadjusting creditors, strongly nonadjusting 
creditors extend credit on terms that fail to adjust even for the overall 
lending portfolio of the creditor. Tort creditors represent one exam­
ple of this kind of lending. Tort creditors become creditors as a result 
of injury or accident without negotiation and without control of the 
terms of their lending. Tax obligations represent another possible ex­
ample of a strongly nonadjusting creditor.28 
This Article uses the terms adjusting and nonadjusting rather than 
the more commonly used terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" credi­
tors29 because the voluntariness of a transaction does not bear directly 
on the efficiency of the terms of the loan. The analysis in this Article 
turns on whether a creditor adjusts the terms of the loan for each 
debtor, not the willingness of the creditor to extend credit. Credit card 
companies, for example, are voluntary lenders, but do not adjust the 
terms of their lending on a transaction-by-transaction basis. 
B. Why Consider Nonadjusting Creditors? 
Nonadjusting creditors are important to the debate on transna­
tional bankruptcy for two reasons. First, as discussed in Section III.A, 
nonadjusting creditors will behave inefficiently under a regime of uni­
versalism, potentially weakening the case for such a regime. Where 
creditors are fully adjusting, they select the lending terms of each 
transaction to yield a competitive return to the lender ex ante. Where 
creditors are nonadjusting, however, they do not tailor terms to the 
27. See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note 20, at 885; Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further 
Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1300 (1997) [hereinafter 
Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts] ("[T]rade creditors generally charge uniform rates to 
all customers that are allowed to purchase on credit. "). 
28. The categorization of creditors as strongly nonadjusting rather than weakly nonad­
justing is sometimes debatable. Tax and other government obligations, for example, may be 
considered weakly nonadjusting because the government is, at least in principle, able to ad­
just the terms of the loan and may be considered to do so over certain portfolios of lending. 
Tort creditors might also be more accurately considered to be weakly nonadjusting if courts 
permit the collection of an interest rate that resembles the risk-adjusted market rate. This 
article assumes that the tax authority and tort creditors are strongly nonadjusting. If it is as­
sumed instead that they are weakly nonadjusting, the arguments advanced in this Article are 
stronger. 
29. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 
passim (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain]. 
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specific transaction. This leads to inaccurate borrowing decisions on 
the part of the debtor and, effectively, a subsidy paid from low-risk 
debtors to high-risk debtors. As a result, high-risk debtors will borrow 
too much (and, therefore, overinvest in their activity), and low-risk 
debtors will borrow too little (and underinvest in their activity). As 
shown in Section III.A, universalism may increase the variation in risk 
faced by lenders and, therefore, may increase the magnitude of this 
distortion. 
Second, and perhaps more important, considering nonadjusting 
creditors serves an important pragmatic objective. Despite the near­
unanimous support of the academic community, policymakers have 
chosen not to adopt universalism. Although a number of other argu­
ments have been advanced for territorialism,30 its support leans heavily 
on a sense among judges, legislators, and some academics that territo­
rialism can help small, local creditors. As a result, local creditors are 
often given protection ex post in the form of a refusal to turn local as­
sets over to a foreign jurisdiction. Writing in 1944, Professor 
Nadelmann stated that "in most of the countries, delivery of local as­
sets ... is refused at least if opposed by local creditors."31 Those writ­
ing on the subject today demonstrate that little has changed.32 Thus, 
reluctance to adopt universalist policies is premised on a general view, 
one even shared by many supporters of universalism, that local credi­
tors suffer losses when a country abandons territoriality. For example, 
Professor Westbrook, the most prominent contributor to the literature 
on transnational bankruptcies and a strong proponent of universalism, 
states: 
The central argument for the Rough Wash is that a universalist rule will 
roughly even out benefits and losses for local creditors, who will gain 
enough from foreign deference to the local forum in one case to balance 
any loss from local deference to the forum in another . ... 33 
And in an accompanying footnote: 
The bulk of countries most likely to join in transnational cooperation are 
those that believe that they are ... countries [in which the ratio of local 
30. See generally LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2. 
31. Kurt H. Nadelmann, International Bankruptcy Law: Its Present Status, 5 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 324, 339 (1944). 
32 See Boshkoff, supra note 6, at 938 ("Cooperation is not valued as highly as the pro­
tection of American creditors."); see also Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, 
Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings Under Section 304, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 
477, 477 (1991) ("[C]ourts and commentators have struggled with the tension between pro­
tecting local claims in local bankruptcy proceedings and promoting international coopera­
tion by ceding control of local assets to a foreign trustee."); Westbrook, Choice of Law, su­
pra note 2, at 518 ("International cooperation will be achieved despite local prejudice only if 
policy makers are convinced . . .  that over a run of cases local prejudice in some cases will be 
balanced by local gains in others."). 
33. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 465. 
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assets to local claims is below the worldwide ratio] at least as often as 
they are ... countries [in which ratio of local assets to local claims is 
above the worldwide average]. Countries that think they will routinely 
be in surplus will not be very eager to join an international scheme; the 
benefits to be realized by everyone from greater realization on assets are 
probably too imprecise to persuade them that greater asset prices will 
outbalance loss of a consistent surplus position.34 
United States courts have demonstrated a similar concern for the 
ex post treatment of local creditors and, as a result, a resistance to uni­
versalism. For example, in In re Toga Manufacturing,35 a Canadian 
company embroiled in bankruptcy proceedings in Canada filed a sec­
tion 304 petition seeking an injunction against creditor action and 
turnover of U.S.-based assets.36 The court denied the petition, stating 
that the "[c]ourt must protect United States citizens' claims against 
foreign judgments inconsistent with this country's well-defined and ac­
cepted policies."37 Similarly, in Interpool Limited v. Certain Freights of 
M/V Venture Star,38 the court asked whether "United States creditors 
will be similarly protected in both jurisdictions"39 and later in the 
opinion stated that "this Court does not intend to stand idly by while 
United States citizens and creditors are harmed."40 Rather than ex­
amining the debtor-creditor relationship from an ex ante perspective, 
these courts looked at the specific questions of law that affect the 
American creditor before the court and asked if that creditor would do 
as well under the foreign proceeding.41 
34. Id. at 465 n.26; see also John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 631, 671-73 (1980) (stating that some may 
view a universal rule in the United States as a "giveaway" if American debtors do not re­
ceive similar treatment abroad); Gary Perlman, The Turnover of Assets Under Section 304 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 521, 531 (1989) (stating that courts that "em­
phasize the interests of U.S. creditors" are more likely to refuse turnover); Westbrook & 
Trautman, supra note 4, at 657 ("The losses [a universalist country's] creditors would suffer 
in some cases would be balanced by gain in others . . . .  It might [require reciprocity out of] 
fearO that otherwise it would suffer greatly in a world of nations committed to the idea of 
territoriality."). But see Kraft & Aranson, supra note 4, at 350 ("[ C]reditors presumably 
know of the potential for bankruptcy and its attendant complications when they decide to do 
business with foreign companies."). 
35. 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1983). 
36. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a U.S. court to order, among other 
things, the turnover of a bankruptcy estate's property to a foreign jurisdiction. See 11 U.S. C. 
§ 304(c). 
37. In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. at 170. 
38. 102 B.R. 373 ( D.N.J. 1988). 
39. Id. at 377. 
40. Id. at 380. This Article argues, of course, that such ex post assessments of the wel­
fare of local creditors do not lead to an overall increase in the well being of those creditors. 
See infra Part IV. 
41. Not all American courts have been as resistant to the use of§ 304. There is a set of 
cases that grant § 304 petitions fairly liberally. See, e.g., In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. 
S. D.N. Y. 1985); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S. D.N. Y. 1982). 
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Though not always understood by courts or commentators, con­
cerns about the plight of local creditors under universalism are simply 
misplaced if all creditors can adjust the terms of their loans to reflect 
the risks they face.42 Contrary to the approach adopted by the courts 
cited above, a sound bankruptcy policy must take into account the fact 
that many creditors adjust the terms of their lending to account for 
their rights in bankruptcy. Because capital markets are competitive, 
adjusting creditors receive a competitive rate of return ex ante. If they 
stand to be denied recovery in the event of bankruptcy, they simply 
will charge a higher rate outside of bankruptcy. As a result, no sound 
reason exists to demand that they receive a particular return in bank­
ruptcy. Put differently, attempts to "protect" local creditors by pro­
viding them with a higher recovery in bankruptcy simply lead to lower 
recoveries by such creditors outside of bankruptcy - the ex ante ex­
pected return remains unaffected. Recognizing the importance of 
adopting this ex ante perspective rather than the ex post perspective 
that dominates the literature is a critical step in understanding the ad­
vantages of universalism. 43 
Once the need for an ex ante perspective is understood, it becomes 
clear that concern for the welfare of local creditors matters only as ap­
plied to nonadjusting creditors, because adjusting creditors will take 
the existing regulations into account.44 The case for territorialism, 
therefore, relies heavily on the presence of nonadjusting creditors. 
Only if these creditors are somehow better off under territorialism can 
that regime be supported. In order to respond to the critics of univer­
salism, therefore, we must consider the effect of universalism in the 
presence of nonadjusting creditors. If it turns out that concerns about 
nonadjusting creditors are misplaced, or if, as this Article argues, the 
costs generated by the presence of nonadjusting creditors are smaller 
in magnitude than the benefits of universalism, then the case for terri­
torialism fails. 
42 See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, at 793-94; Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 35. 
43. The importance of adopting an ex ante perspective is well recognized in the litera­
ture on domestic bankruptcies. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-examination of Near Bankruptcy 
Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1995); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Effects of 
Chapter 11 and Debt Renegotiation on Ex Ante Corporate Decisions (HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL PROGRAM IN LAW AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 104, 1994); 
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994). In the international bankruptcy literature, however, recogni­
tion has taken longer to arrive. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2; Rasmussen, supra 
note 2. 
44. From a more systemic perspective, we must also be concerned with the costs of ad­
justment by the adjusting creditors. These costs, however, will not affect the welfare of ad­
justing creditors because they are simply another factor to take into account when they ad­
just their terms. Put differently, the costs of adjustment will be passed on to the debtor. The 
impact of adjustment costs on our evaluation of territorialism and universalism is discussed 
in more detail below. See infra text accompanying note SS. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF NONA DJUSTING CRE DITORS 
There is an existing debate about the most efficient way to treat 
nonadjusting creditors in the domestic sphere.45 This Article puts that 
debate to one side in order to focus on the international issues that 
arise in the presence of nonadjusting creditors. Specifically, this Arti­
cle seeks to understand how to structure a choice of law rule when 
faced with a transnational bankruptcy. Because such a rule inevitably 
must select the applicable law from the affected domestic systems, the 
specific details of any single system cannot be determinative. Put an­
other way, a rule that turns on choosing the regime with the "best" 
rules is impractical because there is no agreement on which rules are 
best. Thus, regardless of who is correct in the full priority debate in 
the domestic sphere, the analysis of this Article offers insight into how 
nonadjusting creditors should be treated in transnational cases. 
A. Weakly Nonadjusting Creditors 
This Section examines the impact of weakly nonadjusting creditors 
on transnational bankruptcy policy from an efficiency perspective. Al­
though debtors of a weakly nonadjusting creditor may represent dif­
ferent levels of risk, the creditor will charge all such debtors a common 
rate of interest.46 This pooling of risk implies that debtors represent­
ing a relatively high level of risk for the creditor will be able to borrow 
based on terms that are more favorable than would be the case if the 
creditor were an adjusting creditor. Low-risk debtors, on the other 
hand, will face terms that are less favorable than what an adjusting 
creditor would offer. The low-risk debtors, therefore, subsidize the 
high-risk debtors, and this subsidy affects borrowing decisions. 
Example. Imagine a trade creditor lending to two firms that represent 
identical credit risks, except for the fact that they are subject to different 
bankruptcy regimes. Suppose that under the regime applicable to Firm 
A, trade creditors recover as general unsecured creditors. On this as­
sumption, the creditor can expect little or no recovery from Firm A in 
the event of bankruptcy.47 Assume that the regime applicable to Firm B 
45. The discussion of nonadjusting creditors in the domestic sphere takes place within 
the context of the debate regarding the desirability of granting secured debt priority over 
unsecured debt. The literature on this topic is voluminous. For a list of sources, see 
Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts, supra note 27, at 1281 n.5, 1283 n.11; Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case, supra note 20, at 862 n.23, 865 n.27. 
46. It is more accurate to say that debtors will be charged interest rates that do not fully 
reflect the idiosyncratic risk of their loans. It may be that a creditor adjusts the terms of its 
loans and manages to capture some of this risk. Such partial adjustment would not change 
any of the results. 
47. It is well known that general unsecured creditors typically receive very little in bank­
ruptcy. See infra note 71. 
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gives trade creditors the status of priority claimants in bankruptcy.48 The 
creditors' expected recovery, if Firm B were to file for bankruptcy, may 
be substantial as a result of the priority status afforded to trade creditors. 
From the point of view of the creditor, therefore, Firm A is a relatively 
high-risk debtor while Firm B is relatively low-risk.49 
Despite these differences, however, both Firm A and Firm B can bor­
row on the same terms. This arrangement clearly is inefficient because 
the borrowers are not paying the full cost of capital - there will be too 
much borrowing (and overinvestment) by the high-risk debtor and too 
little borrowing (and underinvestment) by the low-risk debtor. The low­
risk debtor (Firm B) will borrow less than it normally would because the 
terms of the credit are, in part, a subsidy of the high-risk debtor. The 
high-risk debtor (Firm A), on the other hand, will borrow more than it 
would if it had to internalize the full cost of its borrowing. 
The magnitude of the inefficiency in lending by weakly nonad­
justing creditors will depend on the range of risks they face when they 
make their loans. As the difference in risk between loans to the high­
and low-risk debtors grows, so does the magnitude of the associated 
distortion.so For the moment, assume that all non-bankruptcy related 
risks are the same for all loans. This allows the analysis to focus on 
the bankruptcy issues relevant to the current discussion.st If, under 
this assumption, all loans represent roughly the same level of risk in 
bankruptcy, the outcome will be close to the efficient outcome - the 
rate charged on these loans will be close to the rate that an adjusting 
creditor would charge. In the extreme, if all loans receive the same 
treatment in bankruptcy,s2 then, all else being equal, a fully adjusting 
creditor would charge all debtors the same interest rate - and that 
rate would be the same as the one charged by the nonadjusting credi­
tor. If, on the other hand, the loans vary wildly in terms of risk, the 
nonadjusting creditor will nevertheless charge all debtors the same 
rate and, therefore, will lend less efficiently. Symmetrically, for indi­
vidual debtors, as the interest rate charged by the nonadjusting credi-
48. Under U.S. law, this means that they would be entitled to priority under section 507 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 
49. Because the firms are assumed to be identical except for the applicable bankruptcy 
law, the designations high- and low-risk refer only to the bankruptcy risk facing the creditor. 
50. Formally, as the variance in the distribution of risk faced by the creditor grows, so 
does the magnitude of the associated distortion. 
51. The impact of territorialism on other risks will be discussed infra where it is shown 
that one of the costs of territoriality is that it increases the risks that creditors must take in 
making loans. See infra Section III.A. 
52. This is the case for purely domestic lending because the same bankruptcy rules apply 
regardless of the identity of the debtor. Recall that we have assumed that all debtors are 
identical in order to isolate the effect of the bankruptcy rules. 
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tor moves further from the interest rate that an adjusting creditor 
would charge, the distortionary effect on borrowing decisions grows.53 
Notice that, despite the presence of this distortion, weakly nonad­
justing creditors are not "cheated" in any way. That is, over their full 
portfolio of loans, they receive an expected return that is adjusted for 
the overall risk they face.54 Because these creditors receive, on aver­
age, a market return, our choice of law objective is simply to enhance 
the efficiency of this lending - the benefits from which are enjoyed by 
the debtor. From an efficiency perspective, therefore, an optimal 
choice of law rule seeks to reduce the variation in risk faced by a given 
creditor. Reducing the variance of a creditor's expected return in the 
event of bankruptcy reduces the size of the distortion created by the 
existence of weakly nonadjusting creditors, and thereby reduces the 
subsidy provided by low-risk debtors to high-risk debtors. If we can 
ensure that the creditor faces a single bankruptcy regime, and thus a 
single set of bankruptcy risks, the amount of lending and borrowing 
will be closer to the efficient level than if the applicable bankruptcy 
regime varies according to the identity of the debtor. 
Under territorialism, a creditor can seek recovery from local assets 
under local bankruptcy rules. Assuming that sufficient assets are 
available, the creditor need not consider the application of any other 
bankruptcy law. In this sense, the lending of that creditor is governed 
by a single bankruptcy regime.55 Under universalism, a creditor's re­
covery in bankruptcy depends on the substantive rules of bankruptcy 
- in particular the priority scheme - of the debtor's jurisdiction.56 
53. Notice, however, that the cost of being a low-risk borrower with a nonadjusting 
creditor limits the magnitude of the distortion. As the difference in risk presented by the 
low-risk debtor as compared to the high-risk debtors grows, the subsidy paid by low-risk 
debtors to high-risk debtors grows. This eventually will cause some low-risk debtors to seek 
alternative financing rather than pay the implicit subsidy. This will, of course, limit the range 
of risks facing the creditor, and thus limit the distortion of lending markets. 
54. The fact that these creditors are not cheated allows us to dismiss many of the con­
cerns commentators have expressed about the problems creditors will face if they cannot 
adjust on a debtor-by-debtor basis. As a result, we can focus more directly on the overall 
efficiency of the system. See, e.g., LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 712 ("[A] trade 
creditor rarely would find it cost-effective to discover the home countries of its corporate 
customers, let alone to evaluate the insolvency regimes of those countries and to adjust the 
credit terms accordingly."); Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 534 ("There would 
be real difficulty applying Hong Kong preference law to a small United States supplier."). 
55. In many cases, of course, local assets will not be available and the creditor will have 
to file a claim abroad under a foreign law. For the moment, we ignore this possibility in or­
der to make the strongest possible statement in favor of territoriality. See infra Section 
IV.B.3, where the possibility that more than one bankruptcy law applies to the creditor un­
der territoriality is considered. 
56. This Article focuses on the priority systems of bankruptcy regimes because the re­
covery for nonadjusting creditors, who are typically unsecured, depends primarily on 
whether or not they are granted priority status. If they recovery as a general unsecured 
creditor (as opposed to a priority claimant) in a liquidation, the expected recovery is almost 
zero. See LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, supra note 29, at 1932-33 & nn.172-73 
("[S]ecurity tends to expand to the liquidation value of the collateral as a debtor sinks into 
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Because a single creditor may lend to debtors from several different 
countries,57 the bankruptcy risk faced by the creditor will depend on 
the identity of the debtor in a particular case. For a nonadjusting 
creditor, therefore, universalism aggravates the distortion discussed 
above in a way that territorialism does not. Note how this affects the 
lending of nonadjusting creditors. In addition to whatever other fac­
tors affect the expected return on a loan (for example, interest rate, 
financial status of the debtor, maturity date, and so on), the priority 
rules in the various jurisdictions are relevant. A particular loan, there­
fore, will represent a higher risk if the main jurisdiction (for bank­
ruptcy purposes) provides a low priority for the creditor. It will repre­
sent a lower risk if the main jurisdiction grants the creditor a high 
priority. In other words, as a result of the differences among bank­
ruptcy rules, universalism increases the variance of the risks faced by 
the creditor, increases the size of the distortion in lending, and reduces 
the efficiency of lending by weakly nonadjusting creditors. 
Example. Imagine a nonadjusting creditor with two debtors.58 Both 
debtor A and the creditor are from country A and debtor B is from coun­
try B.59 The loans are made in country A. Other than their country of 
origin, the two debtors are identical. Assume that under the domestic 
bankruptcy law of country A, the creditor would not be a priority claim­
ant and, therefore, would share pro-rata with other unsecured creditors. 
Under the laws of country B, however, the creditor would receive prior­
ity and would be paid first, ahead of all other unsecured claimants. 
If the creditor were an adjusting creditor, it would take into account 
the different bankruptcy rules it faces and would charge rates that ac­
count for the treatment it would receive in bankruptcy. For concrete­
ness, suppose that an adjusting creditor would charge 12% for a loan to 
the debtors if that loan were governed by the laws of country A, but 
would demand only 8% if country B's law governed. 
Because the creditor being considered is not, on average, "cheated," it 
must receive the same average return as an adjusting creditor. In our ex­
ample, therefore, the nonadjusting creditor will charge 10%.60 Because 
the debtor from country A gets credit at 10% rather than the 12 % that 
an adjusting creditor would charge, it will borrow more than it would 
financial distress."). In fact, it is only when a firm seeks to reorganize that unsecured credi­
tors are promised significant payment. See id. at 1932 n.172. Reorganization is facilitated by 
universalism rather than territorialism - implying that unsecureds are likely to do better 
under universalism. 
57. Or, under a menu approach, to debtors who have selected a variety of regimes. 
58. The number of debtors could, of course, be increased to any number. I choose two 
only for simplicity. 
59. For the purposes of this example, a debtor that is "from" a country will have its main 
bankruptcy proceedings administered by that country. 
60. The 10% figure assumes that the loans are equal in size. 
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from an adjusting creditor.61 The benefits enjoyed by this debtor will be 
subsidized by the debtor from country B who is charged 10% rather than 
8%.62 This debtor will borrow less than it would in an efficient market.63 
In this example, we see that the creditor lends inefficiently because 
his recovery in bankruptcy depends on the choice of substantive bank­
ruptcy law. As an efficiency matter, therefore, this Section has shown 
that universalism distorts lending markets in a way that territorialism 
does not. Specifically, universalism causes relatively low-risk debtors 
to subsidize relatively high-risk debtors. In Section IV.A.1, this Arti­
cle considers how large this distortion is likely to be. 
B. Strongly Nonadjusting Creditors 
Having discussed the way in which the conventional universalist 
approach affects weakly nonadjusting creditors, I now turn to strongly 
nonadjusting creditors. By assumption, strongly nonadjusting credi­
tors fail to adjust the terms of their lending to reflect the likelihood of 
recovery in bankruptcy. They adjust neither on a case-by-case basis, 
nor over their entire portfolio of loans. There is no reason to think, 
therefore, that changing the treatment given to these creditors in the 
event of bankruptcy will affect their behavior. Consider, for example, 
a tort creditor. Because she does not negotiate the terms of her exten­
sion of credit to the tortfeasor, the tort victim cannot adjust the terms 
of her lending. Law, not contract, determines those terms. Tort vic­
tims and other strongly nonadjusting creditors, therefore, simply ex­
tend credit based on terms that are determined without adjustment for 
the return the creditor will receive, either with respect to a particular 
loan or over a portfolio of loans. A system designed to give these 
creditors the opportunity to recover under local rules would, there-
61. A debtor borrowing up to the point at which the marginal cost of borrowing equals 
the marginal benefit of borrowing will obviously borrow more at a rate of 10% than it would 
at a rate of12%. 
62. In a fully competitive market, this result could not hold in equilibrium. The debtor 
being overcharged for credit (debtor B) would simply tum to a different source, making all 
creditors fully adjusting. In the context of nonadjusting creditors, however, markets will of­
ten be sufficiently illiquid that one debtor can subsidize another. For example, trade credi­
tors may not find it worthwhile to adjust their loans on a case-by·case basis. The credit ex­
tended by these creditors is associated with the sale of goods or services to the debtor. It 
may not be possible for the debtor to acquire the goods or services with more finely tuned 
credit terms. In this situation, the debtor simply will have to accept the higher rate, even 
though it includes a subsidy to debtor A. But see supra note 24 (discussing how creditors 
might achieve partial adjustment in a transnational setting). 
63. In a more complete model of the borrowing process, the rate would have to adjust to 
account for the fact that one debtor is borrowing more than the other. This effect is ignored 
for simplicity. Even if the effect were accounted for, however, it would remain the case that 
either one debtor would subsidize the other, or only one of the debtors would borrow from 
the creditor. 
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fore, yield no efficiency gains. Strongly nonadjusting creditors will 
behave in the same fashion regardless of the bankruptcy rule.64 
There remain only two possible sources of concern regarding 
strongly nonadjusting creditors. First, a form of fairness argument 
might arise, premised on the notion that these creditors somehow are 
entitled to recover under local law. To the extent that this argument 
relies on the frustrated expectations of the strongly nonadjusting 
creditors, it lacks force because the creditors at issue have, by defini­
tion, not relied on local law. The fact that they do not adjust implies 
that their lending behavior is unaffected by the expected rate of return 
on their lending. As long as the bankruptcy proceedings of the home 
country are fair, and as long as these creditors can pursue their claims 
under the laws of the home country, there is no reason not to adopt 
universalism with respect to these creditors. Most importantly, the 
treatment of strongly nonadjusting creditors should not be allowed to 
undermine the increased total recovery and greater fairness generated 
by universalism. Second, it may be argued that strongly nonadjusting 
creditors will find it difficult to litigate their claim in a distant forum. 
To the extent this is true, procedures could be established to appoint a 
representative who could file claims on behalf of groups of such credi­
tors. 65 For example, a representative could represent all employees in 
a case. Such an approach would reduce the costs imposed on these 
creditors. Indeed, if we truly want to reduce the costs facing these 
64. It might be argued that a tort victim can adjust her level of care in response to the 
compensation scheme that is in place. Specifically, the potential tort victim's level of care 
will depend on the expected compensation in the event of an accident. Because only one 
level of care can be selected, it will not be appropriate with respect to all tortfeasors. To the 
extent that there is divergence between the chosen level of care and the level of care that 
would be chosen based on an individual potential tortfeasor, an inefficiency is generated. By 
providing local bankruptcy priority, the argument goes, we reduce the variance in expected 
returns for this creditor in much the same way that we reduce the variance in returns to 
weakly adjusting creditors. The magnitudes at issue here, however, are almost certainly very 
small. It is unlikely that a potential tort victim would change her behavior significantly 
based on the choice of law rules for transnational bankruptcy. First, because she is only 
probabilistically a tort victim, the rules' impact on her will be only a fraction of their impact 
on other creditors. Second, because she does not know the identity of a possible future tort· 
feasor, her conduct will be based on a weighted average of her expected returns under the 
various possible regimes. If one is injured in the United States, the tortfeasor will very likely 
be American - implying that the dominant factor in the potential victim's calculation will 
be American law. Other legal systems will have an impact, but only a small one. Further­
more, the truly important variable for determining the standard of care is the size of the 
damage award. When the tort occurs in the United States, the damage award will be deter­
mined by applying the substantive law of the United States. Only then will the relevant 
bankruptcy regime determine priority. A much larger source of variance than the choice of 
bankruptcy law will be the specifics of the tort - making the choice of bankruptcy law a 
concern of lower order. 
65. The European Union Convention on Bankruptcy, for example, permits the liquida­
tor in an insolvency proceeding in one EU country to file claims on behalf of all creditors in 
that proceeding in other EU proceedings involving the same debtor. See Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT'L LJ. 27, 30 (1998) [hereinafter Westbrook, 
Universal Properties]. 
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creditors, we could achieve this result without altering the priority 
scheme of the main jurisdiction by having the costs of nonadjusting 
creditors (whether individually or collectively) paid by their own gov­
ernments or out of the estate. 
IV. COMPARING UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM 
This Part demonstrates that, although the theory presented in Part 
III shows that the costs of universalism are higher in the presence of 
nonadjusting creditors, these costs are probably quite small. As a re­
sult, the costs of eliminating the distortion caused by nonadjusting 
creditors almost certainly exceed the benefits of doing so. After con­
sidering the magnitude of the identified distortion, this Part examines 
the costs of correcting the problem. Ultimately, the conclusions of this 
Part provide further evidence in support of universalism. Indeed, they 
demonstrate that even deviations from universalism advocated by 
commentators who favor that approach impose costs that outweigh 
their benefits.66 
A. The Costs of Universalism 
1. The Magnitude of the Distortion 
To appreciate the amounts at stake, consider first the impact of the 
distortion on the lending terms of weakly nonadjusting creditors, as­
suming that the amount recovered in the event of the debtor's failure 
depends on the choice of bankruptcy law. When setting the terms for 
its portfolio of loans, one would expect a weakly nonadjusting creditor 
to consider a host of factors that have nothing to do with the relevant 
bankruptcy regime. These would include the characteristics of the 
pool of debtors; alternative uses for the funds; the out-of-bankruptcy 
collection system available to the creditor; the likelihood of bank­
ruptcy; the number and priority of other creditors; the total amount of 
outstanding debt; the likelihood that the debtors will acquire future 
debt; the likelihood that legal claims are currently pending or will arise 
in the future;67 and the ability to enforce a judgment against a foreign 
debtor. 
66. For example, Trautman et al. suggest that they are prepared to accept some devia­
tion from universalism: "If cases should arise where the reasonable expectations of unso­
phisticated creditors (in the United States, 'the little old lady in tennis shoes') might suffer 
unfairly, there is no reason a special rule cannot be applied in such cases." See Trautman et 
al., supra note 6, at 624. In fact, this Section argues that there are good reasons to avoid such 
special rules. 
67. In In re Johns Mansville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), the debtor, 
Johns Mansville was forced to file for banlcruptcy because it was unable to obtain credit ­
the potential lenders were concerned that the future tort claims against Johns Mansville 
would be so large that their loans would not be repaid. See Alan N. Resnick, Bankmptcy as 
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The above factors will be the most important in setting the terms 
of a nonadjusting creditor's lending because they directly affect the 
creditor's return. In contrast, the choice of bankruptcy regime has a 
much more indirect effect on the creditor's return. A change in the 
choice of law regime only affects a particular loan if (i) the debtor is 
foreign; (ii) the bankruptcy laws of the countries involved differ with 
respect to the particular creditor; and (iii) the value of assets is such 
that the difference in the laws translates into a difference in return. 
Because the bankruptcy rules impact the creditor's return indirectly, 
we would expect a change in the choice of bankruptcy regime to have 
only a marginal effect on the terms offered by the creditor negotiating 
in the shadow of the law.68 The choice of territorialism as compared to 
universalism, therefore, will have only a small effect on the expected 
return of the creditor. This implies that factors unrelated to the bank­
ruptcy choice of law will be the primary determinants of the variance 
in returns faced by a particular creditor. Whatever inefficiency this 
variance creates, therefore, will not be sensitive to changes in the 
choice of law system. 
2. The Amount at Stake 
Consider the dollar amounts at stake. Compared to the total 
amounts involved in a bankruptcy, these are likely to be quite small. 
Nonadjusting creditors may hold a significant share of the claims 
against the bankruptcy estate, but a change in choice of law rules will 
affect only a small share of those claims. Thus, for our purposes, we 
need focus only on loans that nonadjusting creditors hold and that will 
receive different treatment under the two systems (universalism versus 
territorialism). 
We are, therefore, not concerned with loans held by secured credi­
tors or other adjusting creditors. Similarly, the distortion discussed 
here will not affect loans held by nonadjusting creditors who are not 
priority claimants.69 Such creditors will collect on the same basis -
pro rata with other creditors - regardless of the choice of law rule. 
Furthermore, these creditors typically receive no recovery in bank­
ruptcy, making the choice of law rule irrelevant.7° Finally, some prior-
a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 
2046 (2000). 
68. That is, one would expect the terms to be relatively inelastic with respect to the 
choice of law rule. 
69. That is, those who do not have a priority under the bankruptcy laws of the home 
country or under local law. 
70. See Domenic E. Herbert & Michael J. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: 
The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed in 1984-1987, 22 
RICHMOND L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1988). 
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ity creditors will receive priority under either choice of law rule. 
These creditors face similar prospects for recovery under either rule.71 
Ultimately, the only group of nonadjusting creditors whose ex­
pected return is significantly affected by the choice of law rule consists 
of those creditors that will receive priority under one choice of law 
rule and not under another. When a firm whose home country is 
abroad ends up in bankruptcy, local nonadjusting creditors will prefer 
territorialism if local law gives them priority, while foreign law does 
not. On the other hand, they will prefer universalism when local law 
does not provide a priority but foreign law does. 
3. Employees and Trade Creditors 
The above discussion demonstrates that the group of weakly 
nonadjusting creditors who are likely to benefit from territorialism 
represents a small percentage of all creditors. Should the efficiency of 
the bankruptcy process be compromised for the majority of creditors 
in order to assist this minority? Proponents of territorialism advocate 
precisely this trade-off. Rather than consider the impact of territori­
alism on all creditors, however, attention is often drawn to a small 
number of creditors that seem to elicit sympathy from commentators. 
In order to address the arguments of territorialists as directly as possi­
ble, therefore, this Article now turns to consider those same creditors. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that they represent only a 
small fraction of the total value at stake in a bankruptcy, and that 
adopting territorialism to assist these creditors will impose a cost on 
the entire system - ultimately leading to a higher cost of lending. 
The weakly nonadjusting creditors that seem to attract the atten­
tion of courts and commentators critical of universalism are employees 
and trade creditors. These creditors, however, present a concern only 
to the extent that they face different outcomes under universalism 
than under territoriality.72 Although one can imagine cases in which 
the choice of law regime may matter for these claimants, it often will 
not. Admittedly, differences exist in the way bankruptcy regimes treat 
claims of employees, and, to a lesser degree, trade creditors. It is im-
71. Strictly speaking, the likelihood of recovery for such creditors under territorialism 
will be a function of local assets and other local priority obligation whereas under univer­
salism it will be determined by worldwide assets and other priority obligation throughout the 
world. This might lead to different outcomes under the different regimes. Recovery may 
also depend on the ordering among priority claimants, in which case the choice of law may 
have some effect. 
72. For example, under Mexican law, employees receive super-priority (including prior­
ity over secured creditors) for unpaid wages earned within one year of the filing for bank­
ruptcy. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 14 n.59 (citing "Ley de Quiebras y de Suspension de 
Pagos," D.0., 1993 art. 261). Under American law, employees do not receive super-priority 
and their recovery as priority claimants is limited to $4,000, which must have been earned 
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S. C. § 507(3). 
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portant, however, not to exaggerate these differences.73 A complete 
comparison of the many national priority schemes lies outside the 
scope of this Article, but a cursory look at a few helps to understand 
the differences and similarities among them. 
First, national systems rarely provide priority status to unsecured 
trade creditors. None of the countries surveyed for this Article pro­
vides such a priority,74 with the exception of France (which provides 
priority to only a limited number of trade creditors75) and Mexico.76 
For a trade creditor, therefore, the filing of bankruptcy by the firm 
probably signals the end of its ability to collect regardless of the appli­
cable choice of law regime.77 In other words, arguments that univer­
salism is unduly harsh on trade creditors,78 or that trade creditors are 
subject to the distortion explained in this Article, miss the mark. In 
the vast majority of cases, the choice of law rule in bankruptcy will 
have no impact on trade creditors because they do not recover any­
thing in either case. 
The treatment of employees presents a more complex problem. A 
basic similarity exists among the various systems, in that every country 
surveyed provides at least some priority status for the claims of em­
ployees.79 Within the category of priority claimants, however, the 
73. "[T]he great majority of systems give high priority to the claims of employees and of 
public entities, especially revenue authorities." Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 
511. "These national (priority] systems differ, although they also have some important 
commonalities. For example, our country is alone, as far as I know, in granting special pro­
tection to consumers who have made deposits with retail stores and landlords. On the other 
hand, we have in common with many other countries priority systems favoring employees, 
the domestic fisc, and secured creditors." Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 65, at 
30. 
74. The following countries' bankruptcy regimes were considered: United States, 
Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and England. 
75. See 1 INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES, supra note 6, at 
353. 
76. See AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL 
STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 69-71 (Tent. Draft Apr. 15, 1998). 
77. This assumes that the firm is to be liquidated. If the firm is to be reorganized, there 
is little doubt that the more efficient regime is universalism. See infra text accompanying 
note 98. 
78. This argument is difficult to support on its own terms because trade creditors are 
almost certainly weakly nonadjusting and, therefore, will receive a market rate of return 
over their portfolio of lending. Given this fact, it is difficult to know what it means for the 
system to be "unduly harsh." Nevertheless, this claim is addressed because the fairness of 
universalism is an oft-cited concern. 
79. See INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES, supra note 6, at 131-
37 {Argentina), 171-72 (Brazil), 269-70 (Egypt), 302-53 (France), 377-78 (Germany), 423-24 
(Israel), 499-500 (Japan), 566 (Netherlands), 592-93 (Switzerland); J.H. DALHUISEN, 
DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY § 1.06(1) {1986) (Eng­
land); AMERICAN LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL 
STATEMENT OF CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW (Tent. Draft, Apr. 15, 1997) (Canada); 11 
u.s.c. § 507 (1994) (United States); INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN 
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status of employees' claims, and the amount of those claims, vary from 
country to country. For example, in the United States, employees' 
claims rank behind only secured claims, administrative expenses, and 
claims allowed under section 502(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.80 The 
amount of employees' claims that are subject to this priority, however, 
is limited to $4,000 for each individual or corporation for wages and 
salaries. There is also a provision for employee benefit plans, but it is 
limited to "the number of employees covered by each such plan multi­
plied by $4,000," minus the amounts paid to the covered employees 
under the wage priority.81 In contrast, Mexican employees receive a 
"super-priority" - recovering ahead of most secured creditors as well 
as other unsecured creditors. Furthermore, it does not appear that 
their potential recovery is capped.82 
The above juxtaposition of the United States and Mexico, how­
ever, is somewhat misleading. Most major countries have comparable, 
though not identical, provisions for the priority status of employees. 
Under the laws of the United States, Canada, Germany, Israel, 
Australia, Switzerland, England, and Egypt, employees receive 
priority behind secured claims and administrative expenses. In Japan, 
the Netherlands, and Argentina the same is true, although employees 
also recover behind at least one tax authority.83 The priority accorded 
employees' claims, therefore, although not completely identical, seems 
broadly consistent across regimes. Somewhat more variation appears 
in the amount of an employee's claim that is entitled to priority status. 
In the United States, as mentioned above, this is limited to $4,000. In 
Canada, it is limited to $2,000. Several other countries give no ap­
parent cap on the size of such claims, while other regimes, such as 
Germany's, limit priority to claims for wages and benefits earned 
within a specified period of time. 
The importance of differences in the size of an allowable claim, 
however, is muted by the nature of employment contracts. Employees 
typically receive payment on a regular basis - biweekly or monthly, 
for example. It is difficult for a firm - especially a large multinational 
firm - to continue to function if it suspends payments to its employ­
ees for more than a couple of pay periods. With the possible excep-
BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 76 (Mexico); Section 556, Corporations (New South Wales) 
Act 1990 {this is a state statute but the laws of other states within Australia are identical); see 
also MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY B-1 (1993). 
80. Section 502(f) claims are those that arise in the ordinary course of the debtor's busi­
ness after the co=encement of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding but before the ap­
pointment of a trustee or the order of relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 502{f) (1994). The complete list 
of priorities under U.S. law is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 507 {1994). 
81. 11 U.S.C. § 507{a){4). 
82. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 76, at 71. 
83. The remaining country surveyed, Brazil, provides a super-priority for employees' 
claims that is subordinate to a super-priority for on-the-job-accident claims. 
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tion of insiders, employees are unlikely to continue working if they are 
not paid. As a result, the employee wage claims that exist in bank­
ruptcy will typically represent a small amount of money per employee 
and will typically cover a short period of time. The actual difference 
between, for example, the open-ended Australian priority (which has 
no cap on wage claims) and the restricted American priority for em­
ployees, therefore, will be much less in practice than it appears from 
the bankruptcy statutes.84 
Even if the treatment of employees varies from one jurisdiction to 
another, addressing the costs of that variance by adopting territorial­
ism simply introduces another cost that will drive up the out-of­
bankruptcy costs of the credit extended by labor. Specifically, as 
elaborated in Section IV.B.4, territorialism undermines the ability of a 
firm to reorganize.85 A bankrupt firm with obligations to its employ­
ees often will pay the employees' claims in its proposed plan of reor­
ganization. Firms do this to keep the employees they will need for a 
successful reorganization and to maintain employee morale. Because 
reorganization is much easier under universalism than under territori­
alism, employees can, therefore, expect a higher recovery in bank­
ruptcy under universalism than under territorialism.86 
4. Creditor Behavior to Reduce the Costs of Universalism 
Finally, if universalism imposes a significant cost on transactions, 
creditors can adapt their behavior to reduce those costs. It generally 
will not be costly for a weakly nonadjusting creditor to acquire enough 
information to adjust its loan - at least partially - in order to take 
into account the relevant bankruptcy regime. In other words, a 
weakly nonadjusting creditor may become an adjusting or partially 
adjusting creditor in order to reduce the costs of universalism. For ex­
ample, imagine a trade creditor that lends to a variety of automobile 
producers. Suppose further that the trade creditor's recovery in bank­
ruptcy depends on the applicable law.87 The relevant universe of pos­
sible laws might include those of the United States, Japan, and 
Germany. Although it may be too costly for the creditor to adjust its 
loans for each of the many small transactions the creditor undertakes, 
84. This argument, of course, is Jess applicable to differences in the treatment of other 
employee claims, such as claims for unpaid benefits. 
85. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing the importance of reorganiza­
tion and the problem it presents for territorialism). 
86. In addition, the greater likelihood of reorganization is valuable to employees be­
cause it makes it more likely that they will be able to keep their jobs after the bankruptcy -
allowing them to avoid the dislocation costs associated with searching for new employment. 
87. This assumption is probably false, see supra Section IV.A.2, but is made for exposi­
tional convenience. 
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the cost of making adjustments to account for the country of origin of 
the debtor would be small. That is, it would cost the creditor very lit­
tle to investigate the bankruptcy laws of each of the three relevant ju­
risdictions and modify its lending arrangements based on the home 
country of the debtor. Note that the creditor would need to undertake 
this inquiry only once, and it could apply the resulting adjustment to 
all subsequent transactions. The cost of the inquiry, therefore, can be 
amortized over many transactions. Alternatively, individual creditors 
could specialize by country and thereby price their loans more accu­
rately. These adjustments would not require customizing each trans­
action, but rather would simply require a small expansion of the 
"menu" of standard transactions to account for the home country of 
the debtor. If the low cost of making this adjustment still exceeds the 
benefits, this simply implies that the overall costs of universalism are 
small. 
B. The Costs ofTerritorialism 
This Section highlights the costs of territorialism that are most im­
portant to our discussion of nonadjusting creditors. It does not, by any 
means, present a complete discussion of the costs of territorialism, but 
it suffices to demonstrate that these costs outweigh those of univer­
salism.88 
1. Informational Needs of Adjusting Creditors 
The first point to note is that territoriality dramatically increases 
the transaction costs faced by adjusting creditors. Imagine, for exam­
ple, a fully adjusting creditor that lends in an unsecured fashion to a 
debtor. In order to adjust the terms of its lending, this creditor must 
investigate a variety of facts, including the size and priority of other 
outstanding debts. Under universalism, the creditor can restrict this 
inquiry to the law of one country (the debtor's home country), and 
then only needs to identify the current and likely future borrowing of 
the debtor and the value of assets likely to be available in bankruptcy 
to satisfy creditors. 
Under territorialism, the creditor's informational needs, and there­
fore its transaction costs, are much greater. The creditor must acquire 
all the information it would need under universalism, and, in addition 
needs to know the current location of assets, the likelihood that they 
88. A more complete list of the costs of territorialism might include the administrative 
cost of administering multiple bankruptcies; the cost of multiple bankruptcies on creditors 
that must pursue their claims in many jurisdictions at the same time; and the costs of a race 
to the courthouse. Once bankruptcy is filed in one jurisdiction, creditors will race to attach 
the assets in jurisdictions in which bankruptcy has not yet been filed and that, therefore, are 
not subject to an automatic stay. 
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will be moved as well as the location to which they might be moved, 
the applicable law in every country in which there are assets or into 
which assets may be moved in the future, and the creditor's priority 
under the bankruptcy laws of each of these jurisdictions. The follow­
ing example demonstrates the difficulties facing an adjusting creditor 
under territorialism. 
Example. Suppose that there are N countries in which assets are cur­
rently located and there exists M other creditors. For simplicity, we ig­
nore the possibility that the assets may be moved prior to bankruptcy or 
that there may be future borrowing - considerations that would further 
increase the amount of information required under territorialism. Under 
universalism, the creditor only needs to identify two pieces of informa­
tion - the value of the assets and its priority under the laws of the home 
country. Under territorialism, however the creditor needs to identify the 
value of assets in every country, the nationality of all other creditors,89 
and its priority in each country - a total of 2N+M pieces of information. 
The extent to which turnover of assets is allowed may also depend on 
the country to which the assets would be delivered - country A may al­
low turnover to country B, but not to country C.90 In this latter case, the 
creditor will require information about each country with respect to 
every other country, plus information on the nationality of other credi­
tors and the value of assets in each country - a total of N2 + N + M 
pieces of information. 
2. The Cost of Information 
Furthermore, the costs of collecting each piece of information is 
greater under territorialism than it is under universalism. For exam­
ple, under territorialism the applicable laws in country A may depend 
on whether or not there has already been a bankruptcy filing in coun­
try B, and whether or not a distribution has taken place.91 Similarly, 
much of the information required under territorialism, but not under 
universalism, is very costly. For example, it is difficult enough to de­
termine the total assets of a firm, but it is much harder to identify the 
location of all those assets because financial documents may not in­
clude locational information. Indeed, in some cases, the information 
required under territorialism is not merely harder to accumulate - it 
is unavailable. For instance, a creditor can almost never know with 
89. The nationality of other creditors is important because territorialism schemes often 
favor local creditors over foreign creditors. 
90. For example, the United Kingdom provides for some flexibility on the part of courts 
when there are certain "established arrangements" in place between the U.K. and the for­
eign jurisdiction. No such arrangements exist with the United States. See Ian F. Fletcher, 
Commentary on Boshkoff: Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 943, 943-44 (1994). 
91. For example, under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, payment in a foreign proceeding 
must be taken into account in an American distribution. See 11 U.S.C. § 508(a) (1994). 
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certainty whether or not collateral will be moved from one jurisdiction 
to another in the future,92 particularly with easily moveable collateral, 
including financial collateral.93 
The most direct consequence associated with the increase in in­
formational costs will be an increase in the cost of borrowing faced by 
the debtor as creditors pass on their higher costs. 
3. The Number of Nonadjusting Creditors 
The increase in costs imposed on creditors (and passed on to debt­
ors) will also alter the behavior of creditors, driving some of them to 
become weakly nonadjusting. The following example serves to dem­
onstrate how this can occur. 
Example. Imagine that a creditor wishes to lend to two identical firms 
and plans to adjust its loan to account for the risks associated with each. 
Suppose that a territorialist regime is in place and that each debtor has a 
50% chance of moving its assets to a separate jurisdiction with bank­
ruptcy rules that are less favorable to the creditor. At the time of the 
loan, the creditor cannot identify whether a debtor will move its assets, 
and so the creditor must charge a rate that is a weighted average of the 
rate it would charge if it knew the assets would be moved and the rate it 
would charge if it knew they would not be moved. In this sense, the 
creditor can only adjust partially. Thus, if one of the debtors moves its 
assets to the foreign jurisdiction, the debtor that has not moved its assets 
(the low-risk debtor) will be subsidizing the borrowing of the debtor who 
moved (the high-risk debtor).94 The formerly adjusting creditor, there­
fore, would face the same distortion that is faced by nonadjusting credi­
tors under universalism. 
92. Although creditors can prevent the movement of collateral from one jurisdiction to 
another by contract, this solution generates significant costs. First, it limits the flexibility of 
investment decisions by reducing the mobility of capital. If the bulk of a firm's valuable as­
sets are unable to change jurisdictions, the firm is less able to respond to opportunities, and 
may be unable to pursue certain high value projects. This problem is especially severe in the 
case of financial assets because the assets are much more valuable to the firm if they can be 
used to cover expenses. If those expenses are subject to the approval of the creditor, there 
will be severe hold-up problems. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, at 800-02 (discuss­
ing the inability of private contracting to eliminate the costs of territorialism). The fact that 
contractual conditions of this sort exist; see LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 758-59, 
does not contradict the claim that such provisions carry costs because the existing system is a 
territorialist one. The existence of such contracts merely suggests that, where they are pres­
ent, they impose a lower cost than the risk that the collateral may be moved. In other words, 
it demonstrates the relative size of the two different costs imposed by territorialism but it is 
not evidence of the size of either of these costs compared to what would exist under univer­
salism. 
93. "In some cases the principal assets will be either mobile or outside the boundaries of 
any country." LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 716 (quoting In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 
F.3d 956, 961-62 (7th Cir. 1996). 
94. See supra note 92. 
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Thus, although territorialism reduces the magnitude of the distor­
tion discussed in Part III, it also increases the number of creditors that 
face a distortion of this type. A priori, the net effect is ambiguous, 
meaning that universalism may be preferred over territorialism even if 
we look only at the efficiency of lending decisions by nonadjusting 
creditors and ignore the various other costs of territorialism.95 This is 
so because if enough creditors are driven to become weakly nonad­
justing creditors, this cost alone could exceed that imposed by the dis­
tortion caused by universalism discussed in this Article. Ultimately, 
this results in inefficient lending by the creditor and a direct harm to 
low-risk debtors, who subsidize high-risk ones. 
Because the informational demands of territorialism increase the 
uncertainty facing nonadjusting creditors, the magnitude of the distor­
tion described in Part III increases. Universalism increases the distor­
tion because creditors may find it difficult to predict the content of the 
bankruptcy rules that will apply to the transaction. Territorialism in­
creases the distortion because creditors will find it difficult to predict 
the value of local assets that will be available in bankruptcy, the na­
tional law that will govern their claim, the nationality of other credi­
tors, and so on. Although the relative size of the distortion created by 
territorialism as compared to universalism is an empirical matter, 
there is no a priori reason to imagine that the distortionary effects of 
universalism exceed those of territorialism. Thus, even looking only at 
the impact on weakly nonadjusting creditors - the one context in 
which universalism appears to impose costs - it is entirely possible 
that territorialism imposes even greater costs. 
4. Territorialism Frustrates Reorganizations 
Because the territorialist argument is strongest in the context of 
liquidations, this Article has focused primarily on that form of bank­
ruptcy proceeding. We also must take into account, however, the ef­
fect of territorialism on the ability of a bankrupt firm to reorganize. 
Many bankruptcies - especially large bankruptcies - involve reor­
ganizations. Table I reports the percentage of firms that filed under 
chapter 7 and chapter 11, categorized by the size of the firm.96 
95. The debtor's ability to move assets also creates strong incentives for strategic be­
havior by debtors and creditors. This problem will be especially severe in the case of finan­
cial assets. A debtor on the verge of bankruptcy, and receiving pressure from creditor A 
could, for example, threaten to move its financial assets to another jurisdiction - where a 
different creditor will be able to collect them - if creditor A does not assist the debtor 
through additional lending, restructuring of the debt, delays in foreclosure, etc. 
96. The percentages do not add up to 100% in some rows because chapter 13 cases are 
not included. 
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TABLE l97 
Chapter 7 Chapter 11 
Under $100,000 53 14 
$100K-$500K 27 30 
$500K-$1M 17 71 
$1M-$5M 5 94 
$5M+ 3 97 
As Table I shows, large firms enter into chapter 11  reorganizations 
much more often than chapter 7 liquidations. Because cross-border 
firms are likely to be large, we can infer that the firms affected by the 
choice of universalism or territorialism will typically be seeking to re­
organize rather than liquidate. This has profound implications for the 
debate on international bankruptcy because it means that we should 
be focusing more attention on reorganizations. Once the attention 
turns to reorganizations, the case for universalism becomes even 
stronger. 
Under universalism, the law of a single country governs the deci­
sion of whether or not to reorganize. The location of the assets affects 
the reorganization decision only to the extent that their location af­
fects the debtor's business.98 Under territorialism, reorganization also 
depends on the decisions of all other relevant jurisdictions. For exam­
ple, reorganization may be impossible if important assets are located 
in a jurisdiction that: i) does not favor reorganizations; ii) believes re­
organization is inappropriate in this case; or iii) feels its local creditors 
can be satisfied out of local assets. Thus, reorganization depends on 
the agreement and cooperation of every jurisdiction in possession of 
firm assets. If, for example, courts in every country adopt a test that 
permits reorganization only when local creditors fare better under 
such a scheme ex post,99 then any given court system will cooperate 
only if the return to its local creditors under a reorganization exceeds 
the return to those creditors under a liquidation. 
In the end, it is clear that a value-maximizing decision on reorgani­
zation requires a centralized procedure. Universalism offers a much 
better framework for reorganizations because it puts all assets of the 
firm under the control of a single court. Allowing each jurisdiction to 
97. Data are taken from Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Char­
acteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 524 tbl.2A (1999). 
98. For example, a production facility in a country that is in the midst of severe political 
turmoil is worth considerably less than one in a country that is at peace. 
99. This approach is suggested by 11 U.S.C. § 304, and is essentially the inquiry under­
taken by the courts in In re Toga and Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the MN Venture 
Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988), see supra text accompanying notes 35-41. 
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arrive at its own conclusion is akin to giving each creditor - or at least 
the creditors of each country - a veto over reorganizations. It is cer­
tain to lead to the liquidation of enterprises that would be more valu­
able as going concerns. Any serious consideration of territorialism, 
therefore, must account for the tremendous difficulty associated with 
reorganizing a firm under that regime. The inability of a territorialist 
regime to deal effectively with reorganization ultimately presents one 
of the largest problems with that approach. 
C. Critiques of Universalism 
In a recent article, Professor LoPucki argues in favor of a form of 
territoriality that he calls "cooperative territoriality."100 His article, 
along with his contribution to this symposium, represent by far the 
most significant defense of territorialism, and therefore deserves a di­
rect response. This Section demonstrates that the arguments ad­
vanced by LoPucki, with the exception of arguments that tum on the 
presence of nonadjusting creditors and that have already been ad­
dressed, do not represent a serious challenge to universalism. To 
make this response as clearly and directly as possible, this Section will 
address each of Professor LoPucki's arguments in the order he ad­
vances them in his 1999 article. 
1. Foreign Law and Courts Governing Domestic Relationships 
The first of LoPucki's concerns is that a domestic debtor-creditor 
relationship would be subject to the bankruptcy rules of a foreign ju­
risdiction.101 "[I]n a universalist system, the priority of Mexican work­
ers against a U.S. firm operating in Mexico would be determined by 
U.S. rules of priority - much to the disappointment of the Mexican 
workers affected.m02 
There appear to be three components to this point. First, there is a 
concern that nonadjusting creditors will fail to take into account the 
applicable bankruptcy rules under universalism. This Article has, of 
course, responded to this concern at length above and, in particular, 
shown that the recovery of employees is not very sensitive to the 
choice of regime.103 
The second concern is that, even if adjustment were possible, "it 
would create a stiflingly complex domestic interface for the interna­
tional bankruptcy system. Presumably, sellers would adjust the prices 
100. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at passim. 
101. See id. at 709-13. 
102 Id. at 711. 
103. See supra Section IV.A.3. 
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of all goods and services sold on credit in the domestic economy to re­
flect the bankruptcy priority of the seller under the law of the debtor's 
home country."104 We would expect this, of course, if all creditors 
were adjusting. Furthermore, this yields the efficient outcome. If all 
creditors adjust, they will structure their out-of-bankruptcy contracts 
to ensure that they receive a market rate of return in expectation. In 
other words, creditors will price their credit appropriately - causing 
credit to flow to its most productive uses, and ensuring that projects 
with a positive expected value will be carried out while those with a 
negative expected value will not. Rather than a cause for concern, this 
is a goal to strive for. 
Finally, LoPucki seems uncomfortable with the notion that the 
country in which assets are located cannot adjudicate the distribution 
of those assets in accordance with its own values and concerns. This 
loss of sovereignty implies that the country in which the assets are lo­
cated must allow its values to be trumped by the values of the main ju­
risdiction. LoPucki's argument, however, overlooks the fact that any 
solution to the choice of law problem posed by a transnational bank­
ruptcy will involve the loss of sovereignty of one country - this is an 
unavoidable consequence of international business activity. Under 
universalism, as LoPucki points out, the country in which the assets 
are located must yield to the main jurisdiction (where these are not 
the same country). He claims that, as a result, creditors in the host 
country will suffer prejudice.105 
The story, of course, could be told from the opposite perspective. 
Imagine, for example, a bankruptcy in which assets are located in 
Mexico (and perhaps elsewhere), creditors are located in both the 
United States and Mexico, and the home jurisdiction under univer­
salism would be the United States.106 That the home jurisdiction is the 
United States suggests that the firm has closer ties to the United States 
than to Mexico.107 To the extent the bankruptcy rules differ between 
the United States and Mexico, a choice of one regime over the other 
will offer an ex post benefit to some creditors while harming others. 
Choosing Mexican law for the adjudication of the assets requires the 
subordination of United States law and policy to those of Mexico. De­
spite the fact that the debtor is more closely associated with the 
United States than with Mexico (as evidenced by the fact that the 
United States is the home jurisdiction) and the fact that at least some 
of the creditors are in the United States, American values are subor-
104. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 711. 
105. See id. 
106. This is the example used by LoPucki, who concludes that turning the assets over to 
U.S. jurisdiction is undesirable because Mexico loses its ability to implement its system of 
bankruptcy values. See id. at 710-12. 
107. See infra note 108 (discussing the determination of the home jurisdiction). 
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dinated.108 This leaves the United States unable to implement its own 
value system just as much as choosing United States bankruptcy law 
would frustrate Mexican goals (and perhaps more because of the 
debtor's close association with the United States). The important 
point is that the distribution of assets (ignoring transaction costs, 
which, as this Article has argued, are lower under universalism) is a 
zero-sum process. The choice-of-law problem is, as a result, also zero 
sum - where the values of two countries conflict, one must be chosen 
at the expense of the other. The value of assets whose distribution is 
affected by the choice of law regime represents the loss of sovereignty 
of one country in favor of that of another. This fact is an unavoidable 
part of the choice of law decision. Put simply, international business 
activity requires the compromise of certain notions of national sover­
eignty because many countries may have an interest in the fate of 
debtors and their creditors. 
2. Indeterminacy of the "Home Country" Standard 
For universalism to work, of course, one must identify the "home 
country" of the debtor. In the purest form of universalism, the gov­
erning law is that of the "main" jurisdiction, defined as the home 
country of the debtor.109 Possible approaches for defining the main ju­
risdiction include the place of incorporation, the principal place of 
business,110 and the "center of main interests."111 The factors that 
should drive the choice are the ease with which the home country can 
be identified and the ease with which the debtor can choose or select 
the applicable law. The parties to a transaction must know which is 
the main jurisdiction in order to adjust the terms of the loan appropri­
ately, but if it is too easy for the debtor to change the main jurisdic­
tion, it could choose in such a way as to disadvantage strongly nonad-
108. It might be argued that the plausible candidates for determining the home jurisdic­
tion will sometimes choose a jurisdiction that is, at least arguably, not the one with the great­
est connection to the debtor. Even if that is true, it is clear that in the vast majority of cases, 
the home jurisdiction will be a good proxy for the country most interested in the debtor. 
109. Under a contracting reginte, like the one suggested by Rasmussen, the relevant ju­
risdiction would be whatever was chosen by the debtor ex ante. See Rasmussen, supra note 
2. 
110. See Trautman et al., supra note 6, at 580; Trautman, Foreign Creditors, supra note 
4, at 55 (arguing for the principal place of business test). 
111. This is how the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency identifies the 
home country. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 7, at Art. II(b); Manfred Baiz, The European Union 
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. LJ. 485, 504 {1996) (stating that EU 
Convention takes the center of main interests to be "the principal place of business . • .  
[which] until proof to the contrary [is presumed to be] the place of the registered office"); 
Berends, supra note 7, at 329-30; European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 
Nov. 23, 1995, art. 3, para. 1, 35 l.L.M. 1223. 
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justing creditors that are likely to interact with the firm. This, in turn, 
would generate an incentive for countries to provide regimes that 
grant nonadjusting creditors a low priority. For this reason, a test 
based on the place of incorporation would be inappropriate.112 A test 
such as the principal place of business, on the other hand, is much 
more difficult for the debtor to manipulate.113 Determining the main 
jurisdiction using, for example, the principal-place-of-business test or 
the center-of-main-interests test, typically will be easier than attempt­
ing to identify the location of all the debtor's assets - including finan­
cial assets and future assets - which may be spread among many ju­
risdictions and which may be moved at any time. Also note that under 
territorialism a debtor may have an incentive to mislead a creditor re­
garding the location of assets in order to make the creditor believe it 
faces a favorable bankruptcy regime. The creditor, therefore, must 
independently verify the location of all assets. 
Professor LoPucki claims that the lack of agreement over the stan­
dard to use in identifying the home country represents a serious prob­
lem for advocates of universalism, stating that "the home countries of 
a substantial number of companies remain in doubt."114 To the extent 
that he refers to the fact that no single test has emerged as the pre­
ferred test, his critique relates to the implementation of universalism, 
and not to its merit. There is no doubt that a universalist system 
should choose a single test to determine the home jurisdiction, but this 
does not constitute a reason to prefer territorialism. 
If Professor LoPucki refers instead to the fact that, under any test, 
close cases will arise in which the home country is difficult to identify, 
his claim that there are many such cases conflicts with the views of 
most commentators. In fact, there is widespread agreement among 
those interested in transnational insolvency that, in the vast majority 
of cases, the home country will be easy to identify - making the issue 
a minor question.115 In those few cases where ambiguity exists, credi­
tors must take that uncertainty into account when they negotiate the 
112. One could give the debtor the ability to select the main jurisdiction at the time of 
incorporation as long as nonadjusting creditors are protected. This would require some form 
of cooperation among countries to fix the priority status of these creditors. This point has 
been made in both the domestic and international debates. See Barry Adler, Financial and 
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 339-40 (1993); 
Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 21-22; Alan Schwarz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997). 
113. Note that whichever test is used, it would be best for a single criteria to serve as the 
determining factor (e.g., the principal place of business) in order to promote clarity and pre­
dictability. 
114. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 713. 
115. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 12 ("In most situations, it will be clear which coun­
try is the home of the debtor."); Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 529 ("Although 
circumstances will exist in which determination of the home country of a corporation will be 
difficult, it will usually be self-evident."). 
2208 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2177 
loan. Although this will introduce inefficiency in some cases, creditors 
rarely will need to consider more than two jurisdictions. Contrast this 
outcome with territorialism, under which creditors must consider the 
laws of all jurisdictions in which assets are located, or into which assets 
may move. 
It does not suffice, of course, merely to point out that occasional 
problems will arise with identifying the home country. Although no 
one could seriously claim that the choice of law problem in transna­
tional bankruptcies - regardless of the rule adopted - will be simple 
in every case, the proper question is not whether the home country 
standard is fully predictable in one hundred percent of the cases, both 
real and imagined, but rather, whether it provides greater total bene­
fits than the possible alternatives. This, of course, brings us back to a 
comparison of the relative merits of territorialism and universalism. 
On the issue of predictability, it seems that universalism presents the 
better choice. While occasional cases may occur in which the identity 
of the home country remains in doubt, a territorial approach based on 
the future location of assets - including mobile assets, financial as­
sets, and assets not yet acquired - clearly does not present a more 
predictable choice of law rule. Basing jurisdiction on the home coun­
try of the debtor, regardless of which definition of home country is 
used,116 leads to greater certainty than does a territorial approach. 
Professor LoPucki does not deny that the removal of assets on the 
eve of bankruptcy is a serious problem for territorialism. He argues, 
however, that the problem can be solved within a territorialist frame­
work. Under his system, assets would be "located" in a country if that 
country were able to exercise power over them.117 The idea is that 
only a small number of countries will have this ability over any given 
asset at any given time. As a result, he argues, this system provides a 
reasonably clear rule. 
This approach is difficult to square with Professor LoPucki's gen­
eral argument that a universalist system leaves the identity of the 
home country indeterminate. In order to lend efficiently, a creditor 
needs to know, at the time of contracting, which legal regime's rules 
will control the distribution of assets in a bankruptcy. Professor 
LoPucki's proposed rule would lead to much greater uncertainty re­
garding the applicable law than would a universalist regime. First, 
Professor LoPucki concedes that more than one country may have the 
116. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
117. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International 
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2219-20 (2000). 
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ability to control an asset at the time of bankruptcy, making the appli­
cable bankruptcy rule uncertain.U8 
Second, recognizing that the problem of strategic removal of assets 
is a serious one under territorialism,119 he proposes the establishment 
of treaties to ensure that such assets are returned to the country in 
which they were located during the pre-bankruptcy period. Professor 
LoPucki does not provide further details regarding the treaties he has 
in mind. Instead, he argues that the problem of strategic removal is 
small because creditors can contract to prevent such removal, and lo­
cal law can criminalize extreme versions.120 It is true that contractual 
solutions to the problem of removal are possible, but they come at sig­
nificant cost. Notice that the problem here is much greater than the 
strategic removal of assets on the eve of bankruptcy. It includes the 
movement of assets at any time after the creditor lends to the debtor. 
Such movement undermines the efficiency of the lending process. The 
sort of restrictions on the movement of capital that Professor LoPucki 
cites as a solution to the problem of capital movement, therefore, 
would restrict such movement for the entire life of the loan. If credi­
tors impose restrictions on the movement of assets, they limit the abil­
ity of the firm to pursue opportunities abroad. This represents both a 
private and social cost that is avoided through universalism.121 Estab­
lishing a system that encourages such contractual conditions on all 
large-debt contracts represents a significant constraint on international 
capital mobility.122 
Although the above arguments support universalism, they also 
provide support for the contract-based approach advocated by Profes­
sor Rasmussen.123 Under his proposed regime, a debtor would choose 
its "home" country at the time of incorporation. Because this choice 
takes place before the corporation has any creditors, all creditors can 
adjust the terms of their lending to take the chosen regime into ac­
count.124 The key difference between the contracting approach and 
universalism is that the former gives debtors the ability to make a one-
118. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 743 ("Often more than one country will 
have (de facto power over assets], necessitating further agreement to fix a single location."). 
Professor LoPucki does not specify the sort of further agreement that he has in mind. 
119. See id. at 758 ("The problem of strategic removal of assets on the eve of bankruptcy 
would be more severe under territorialism than universalism."). 
120. See id. 
121. A more detailed discussion of the problem with private solutions to territorialism 
can be found in Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, at 800-02. 
122. See supra note 92. 
123. See Rasmussen, supra note 2; Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational In­
solvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 [hereinafter Rasmussen, Pri­
vate Ordering]. 
124. See Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 5. 
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time choice of the applicable law at the time of incorporation. The 
addition of such choice should lead to an increase in efficiency and 
welfare, as Professor Rasmussen argues, making the choice-based ap­
proach an attractive option. 
As a theoretical matter, there is little to criticize about the contract 
model. The most serious problem with a contracting model is the po­
tential incentive it may provide to lawmakers to establish "debtor ha­
vens." Rasmussen recognizes this problem and argues convincingly 
that the magnitudes involved are likely to be small.125 In his view, 
debtor havens remain an issue only for tort creditors, and for this 
group he proposes that "any bankruptcy regime selected by a firm ac­
cord at least nominal priority to tort victims similar to what they 
achieve in their home country."126 In my view, Rasmussen's approach 
to the debtor haven question resolves any concern that a choice-based 
system would cause strategic behavior by national governments trying 
to take advantage of nonadjusting creditors. If additional creditors are 
deemed strongly nonadjusting, they should receive the same treatment 
as tort creditors. 
The primary difficulty with a contract-based system is not that it 
somehow represents bad policy, but rather that it is incomplete. In the 
absence of a mechanism for changes in the chosen bankruptcy regime, 
the contracting regime will typically lead to outcomes identical to a 
universalist regime, because firms typically will choose the applicable 
regime long before they engage in transnational activities. At the time 
of incorporation, a firm cannot be expected to anticipate its future 
structure and future bankruptcy needs. Indeed, even a cursory exami­
nation of available bankruptcy regimes may represent a cost that out­
weighs the benefits for a new corporation, because that firm's business 
activities normally will be domestic in nature when it begins opera­
tions, making a choice of the local regime likely. Thus, where a firm 
exercises choice at the time of incorporation, one normally would ex­
pect it to choose the local regime - making the system identical to 
universalism. 
Under a contract-based regime, of course, lawmakers would need 
to adopt default rules for those cases in which no regime was explicitly 
chosen. The search for a default rule leads us back to the question of 
whether territorialism or universalism is preferable. For all the rea­
sons advanced by supporters of universalism, that system would repre­
sent the better default rule. 
An additional problem may arise in the implementation of a 
choice-based international regime alongside a mandatory domestic re-
125. Rasmussen's arguments are, in many ways, similar to those advanced in this Arti­
cle. See Rasmussen, Private Ordering, supra note 123, at 2264-74 (discussing debtor havens). 
126. Id. at 2271. 
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gime. A firm that starts its business without any international connec­
tions would be subject to the domestic regime, regardless of its at­
tempts to choose another regime at the time of incorporation. When 
the firm becomes a "transnational firm" (however defined), it would 
then receive the benefit of its choice of regime. Such a change in ap­
plicable bankruptcy regime, of course, would impact existing creditors 
in a way that introduces distortions in the firm's investment deci­
sions.127 In fairness to Rasmussen, he also has advocated a choice­
based approach to domestic bankruptcy, and if choice were adopted in 
both the domestic and international context, the treatment of domes­
tic and international firms would become consistent. Rasmussen's 
proposal, therefore, requires much more sweeping changes to the 
bankruptcy laws. Universalism, on the other hand, does not require 
any adjustments to the domestic system. 
3. The Extent of Jurisdiction of Corporate Groups 
LoPucki accurately points out that large firms often operate as a 
group of separately incorporated firms rather than as a single transna­
tional entity. Should such a group be handled as a single enterprise in 
bankruptcy, or should it be treated as a series of independent firms 
(perhaps each with its own bankruptcy filing)? 
The presence of corporate groups clearly complicates the adjudica­
tion of a transnational insolvency. This is true under either territori­
alism or universalism. Under universalism, the danger is that creditors 
must take into account the manner in which the home country of a 
parent corporation will treat the group. If the subsidiary will be con­
sidered part of the group and, therefore, brought into a bankruptcy in 
the parent's home country, the bankruptcy law of that country will 
have to be taken into account. On the other hand, if the subsidiary 
will be treated as an independent entity, the bankruptcy law of the 
home country of the subsidiary is the relevant one. Needless to say, 
this complicates the analysis facing an adjusting creditor, and increases 
the distortion caused by weakly nonadjusting creditors.128 
Once again, however, the relevant question is not whether univer­
salism makes transnational bankruptcies work as well as domestic 
bankruptcies, but rather, whether it offers a better solution than terri­
torialism. Territorialism provides creditors with predictability inas­
much as creditors can be sure that local law will govern the distribu-
127. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2. 
128. Another consequence of the presence of corporate groups may also be to increase 
the number of weakly nonadjusting creditors. If the manner in which the home country of 
the parent will decide whether or not to exercise jurisdiction over the subsidiary is unknown 
or unpredictable, creditors who would normally be adjusting creditors may be forced to be­
have like weakly nonadjusting creditors with respect to the subsidiary. 
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tion of local assets. What territorialism cannot provide, however, is 
any certainty regarding the share of the group's assets that will be 
within the jurisdiction at the time of filing, or a workable mechanism 
for reorganizations. 
Note first that the existence of corporate groups is a manageable 
problem for adjusting creditors. Secured creditors, for example, often 
solve the problem by taking a security interest not only in the assets of 
the debtor, but also in the assets of related corporations - either par­
ents or subsidiaries. The bankruptcy of the debtor triggers a default 
on the loan and permits collection efforts against other members of 
the corporate family. As a result, secured creditors can effectively 
bring the assets of the entire corporate family within their reach. Un­
der a universalist regime, the creditor can then recover in bankruptcy 
from the family members that are included in the estate and out of 
bankruptcy from those family members that are outside the estate. 
Largely the same result will come about under a territorialist regime, 
except that the creditor must pursue recovery in separate bankruptcy 
proceedings in each country in which assets are located - increasing 
collection costs. Furthermore, under territorialism, the decision of 
which members of the family will be put into bankruptcy will be made 
independently by national courts. This encourages a race to the 
courthouse in cases where some members of the corporate family are 
not yet in bankruptcy, and a duplication of litigation, across jurisdic­
tions, regarding whether or not to put a member of the family into 
bankruptcy. 
Second, as a corporate group approaches bankruptcy, there may 
be significant transfers of value from one member of the corporate 
group to another. This may be done, for example, in an attempt to 
stave off bankruptcy through restructuring or to pay off important 
debtors on whom the debtor needs to rely post-bankruptcy. This sort 
of planning prior to bankruptcy renders a territorialist approach highly 
unpredictable. A debtor that hopes to reorganize, for example, will 
have a strong incentive to place as many assets as possible in a jurisdic­
tion that makes reorganization possible. Even if the debtor intends to 
liquidate the firm, some jurisdictions may allow equity holders to ex­
tract value while others may not - giving the debtor more reason to 
locate assets strategically. 
The existence of corporate groups also aggravates the problem of 
reorganization because effective reorganization may require jurisdic­
tion over several separately incorporated members of the group. It is 
important to note, however, that this results not from the existence of 
a universalist regime, but rather from the existence of corporate 
groups. Under a universalist regime, the existence of corporate 
groups makes reorganization somewhat more difficult but still possi-
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ble. Under a territorialist regime, however, reorganization is virtually 
impossible.129 
Although the problem of corporate groups does not justify a move 
to territorialism, it does provide a reason to seek cooperation among 
national governments in the implementation of a universalist bank­
ruptcy regime. For example, if governments could agree on how to 
determine the extent of the bankrupt estate, the adjustment of credi­
tors would be simplified. A creditor would only need to consider a 
single rule in order to understand which parts of the corporate group 
would fall within the bankruptcy. 
In order to demonstrate that universalism can handle the corpo­
rate groups problem as well as territorialism, consider the following 
approach.130 Suppose that every separately incorporated entity is 
treated as an independent firm with its own bankruptcy proceedings. 
Several disadvantages come to mind immediately. First, reorganiza­
tion of the entire group will be very difficult. Second, creditors will re­
cover based on the assets of a specific member of the group, and the 
pre-bankruptcy debtor may have moved assets from one group mem­
ber to the other.131 Finally, costs are imposed on creditors that must 
file in multiple bankruptcy proceedings, and upon the courts that must 
hear the cases. These costs, however, are quite similar to the costs of 
territorialism. Indeed, a debtor could structure its dealings in order to 
replicate the outcome that would exist under territorialism by incorpo­
rating a single, separate entity in each jurisdiction and giving that en­
tity ownership of all local assets. The point of this example is not to 
advocate a rule that would treat every incorporated entity as a sepa­
rate firm for bankruptcy purposes, but rather, to demonstrate that 
even such a crude rule will perform as well as territorialism. With 
even a minimal level of international cooperation, the problem of cor­
porate groups can be resolved more easily under universalism than 
under territorialism. 
Furthermore, although a full analysis of how to handle the prob­
lem of corporate groups lies beyond the scope of this Article, one can 
easily imagine strategies superior to the "one incorporation-one bank­
ruptcy proceeding" approach mentioned above - implying, of course, 
that it is easy to identify approaches that deal with the issue more suc­
cessfully than does territorialism. For example, a rule giving the home 
country of a parent corporation jurisdiction over its subsidiaries, sub-
129. See supra Section IV.B.4 (discussing reorganization under territoriality). 
130. This approach is not presented as an optimal strategy. There is almost certainly a 
better way to handle corporate groups. Rather, it is to demonstrate that even with this un­
sophisticated and simple strategy it is possible to handle the problem of corporate groups 
more successfully than would be done under territoriality. 
131. In this situation, of course, the creditor may be able to protect itself through private 
contract, but doing so will restrict capital mobility and the flexibility of the debtor. 
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ject to a requirement of a certain level of integration, would preserve 
many of the benefits of universalism. It would, of course, reduce the 
certainty enjoyed by creditors who, in some cases, may be uncertain 
about whether a jurisdiction will extend to certain subsidiaries, 132 but 
this uncertainty will be considerably less than it would be under terri­
torialism, where the future location of the assets is entirely unpredict­
able. 
4. Strategic Manipulation of the "Home Country" Standard 
Finally, LoPucki argues that the "home country" standard pro­
vides debtors with the incentive and the ability to engage in forum 
shopping.133 Forum shopping in the international context is clearly 
undesirable,134 but this point weighs in favor of universalism, not terri­
torialism. Once again, the appropriate question is not whether one 
could imagine a situation in which universalism fails to achieve the 
best imaginable outcome, but rather whether universalism or territori­
alism brings us closer to that outcome. 
The risk of forum shopping presents a serious problem for territo­
rialism because, under that regime, it can be accomplished simply by 
moving assets from one jurisdiction to another. In order to deter fo­
rum shopping, a universalist regime must avoid identifying the home 
jurisdiction based on easily changeable criteria, such as the place of in­
corporation. Criteria for identifying the home jurisdiction and that are 
costly to change, however, are easy to find.135 A test based on the 
main location of firm activity or the location of assets, for example, 
would be very costly for the firm to change, and would therefore deter 
forum shopping. Where the criteria for identifying the home country 
are sufficiently costly to manipulate, no more than a tiny number of 
firms would be induced to make such a change in order to capture the 
benefits of a particular forum. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the debate regarding the regulation of transnational bankrupt­
cies is to move forward, those who support universalism must address, 
in very specific terms, the arguments advanced by its opponents. To 
132. Though creditors normally will be able to narrow the potential number of applica­
ble jurisdictions to a very few. 
133. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 2, at 720-21. 
134. See id. at 721. The most serious problem with forum shopping would be that it 
would systematically disadvantage strongly nonadjusting creditors, including creditors in ex­
istence when the debtor enters the forum. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 2, for a dis­
cussion of how this can generate costs in the international context. 
135. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
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date, the most popular and persuasive of those arguments has been an 
appeal to the plight of local creditors. If local creditors are adjusting 
creditors, however, they simply are not better off under territorialism. 
This Article also demonstrates that the efficiency arguments for uni­
versalism remain strong even in the presence of nonadjusting credi­
tors. Although universalism magnifies the risk-based distortion in 
lending by nonadjusting creditors, the magnitude of the impact is al­
most certainly small. Furthermore, territorialism has its own way of 
aggravating the distortion by increasing the number of nonadjusting 
creditors. Thus, even if one looks only at the implications for nonad­
justing creditors, territorialism cannot be shown to be a superior ap­
proach. If one looks more broadly at the issue of transnational bank­
ruptcies, taking into account factors such as the informational 
demands of each regime and the impact of each on reorganization, it 
becomes clear that the case for territorialism is weak. Finally, it is 
worth noting that this Article has understated the benefits of univer­
salism and the costs of territorialism. In order to avoid a repetition of 
arguments already in the literature, this Article has not discussed fac­
tors such as the cost of multiple adjudications under territorialism, the 
improved capital allocation under universalism, and the increased liq­
uidation value under universalism.136 Those well-established argu­
ments, as well as those advanced in this Article, make the case for uni­
versalism over territorialism compelling. 
136. See supra notes 11-16. 
